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Abstract 
In science and beyond, numbers are omnipresent when it comes to justifying different 
kinds of judgments. Which scientific author, hiring committee-member, or advisory board 
panelist has not been confronted with page-long “publication manuals”, “assessment reports”, 
“evaluation guidelines”, calling for p-values, citation rates, h-indices, or other statistics in 
order to motivate judgments about the “quality” of findings, applicants, or institutions? Yet, 
many of those relying on and calling for statistics do not even seem to understand what 
information those numbers can actually convey, and what not. Focusing on the uninformed 
usage of bibliometrics as worrysome outgrowth of the increasing quantification of science and 
society, we place the abuse of numbers into larger historical contexts and trends. These are 
characterized by a technology-driven bureaucratization of science, obsessions with control 
and accountability, and mistrust in human intuitive judgment. The ongoing digital revolution 
increases those trends. We call for bringing sanity back into scientific judgment exercises. 
Despite all number crunching, many judgments – be it about scientific output, scientists, or 
research institutions – will neither be unambiguous, uncontroversial, or testable by external 
standards, nor can they be otherwise validated or objectified. Under uncertainty, good human 
judgment remains, for the better, indispensable, but it can be aided, so we conclude, by a 
toolbox of simple judgment tools, called heuristics. In the best position to use those heuristics 
are research evaluators (1) who have expertise in the to-be-evaluated area of research, (2) who 
have profound knowledge in bibliometrics, and (3) who are statistically literate.    
 
Key words: Research Evaluation; Bibliometrics, Statistics, Judgement Under Uncertainty, 
Fast-and-frugal Heuristics. 
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Edinburgh, 1 Janurary 1789 Many people were at first surprised at my using the 
words, Statistics and Statistical… In the course of a very extensive tour, through the 
norther parts of Europe, which I happened to take in 1786, I found that in Germany 
they were engaged in a species of political inquiry to which they had given the name 
of Statistics. By statistical is meant in Germany an inquiry for the prupose of 
ascertaining the political strength of a country, or questions concerning matters of 
state; whereas the idea I annexed to the term is an inquiry into the state of a country, 
for the purpose of ascertaining the quantum of happiness enjoyed by its inhabitants 
and the means of it future improvement.  
 
Sir John Sinclair at the completion of his Statistical Account of Scottland  
        
Hacking (1990, p. 16) 
 
Introduction 
Once, one of us spent a day in Greding, a small German village. While wandering 
around the medieval houses, he accidently ran into a curiosity, dating back to the 14th century: 
a large pile of bones and skulls with a sign attached to those remnants of about 2,500 humans, 
stating: “What we are, you will turn into. What you are, we have been.” 
How many of us live without reflecting that they might soon die, or that their children, 
fathers, and sisters will turn cold and decompose – today, tomorrow, or in some other 
uncertain future? How many scientists think about death other than as a subject of research? 
In peaceful developed countries, death and dying are located in the distant, in those “poor 
others” who are, unfortunately, suffering from it – in wars, several thousand miles away, or in 
the sterile, isolated stations of hospitals around the corner. This was not always so. The 
uncertainty of life ikely occupied a more prominent place in collective consciousness, for 
example, 2,000 years ago in Roman households, and other times of high infant mortality, and 
recurring epidemics (e.g., Malaria in Rome; Scheidel, 1994). 
It seems as if the achievements of science – including modern medicine – veil death’s 
skeleton, and so does, most likely the technology-driven culture dominating Western 
societies. Yet, are people less afraid of life’s uncertainty? The fear of death, so one might 
think, is there, but perhaps its targets have morphed. Today, doctor’s dread law suits from 
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their patients, and John Q. Public trembles at the prospect of not being able to pay back his 
credit. Young scientists fear to lose their jobs, and senior scientists fear the next bibliometric 
report. Yet, just as thousands of years ago, fear continues to be an emotion that targets 
something near-present or future, that is, potentially uncertain happenings. And just like in the 
past, also nowadays people seek relief, in one way or the other, from fear’s clinging grips. In 
extreme cases, remedies against fear include pharmaceuticals (e.g., selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors) or psychotherapy. In less severe ones, the job is done by sports, 
meditation, or the products of the well-being and insurance industries (e.g., unemployment 
insurances). Common to most fear relievers is that they aid to shape thinking processes and 
belief systems.  
The focus of this essay is on such powerful mean to shape – and often cloud – 
people’s judgments: numbers. Numbers have been turned into, so we argue, in allusion to 
Karl Marx’ famous statement about religion, the new opium of the people, namely when it 
comes to making judgments about uncertain things. Numbers affect the general public as 
much as those experts who dedicate their lives to produce, process, and scrutinize numbers: 
scientists. Give people numbers, and they will have something to hold on to, to be blinded by, 
or to argue against. Numbers influence what we fear, and also how we reason about our fears 
– be it when trying to assess the probability of dying in an airplane crash (“Just 1 in several 
million!”), our life expectancy at age 50 (“Still about 30 years of life remain!”), or when 
calculating how much unemployment benefits will enter our bank accounts if we don’t 
happen to get tenure (“80% of the last salary for 1 year!”). Our central theses are as follows: 
1. Numbers dramatically change how we make judgments under uncertainty – not 
only about fear-inspiring events, but also about multiple other aspects of science 
and society. Particularly, during the past century, p-value statistics and other 
numbers have transformed the way social scientists evaluate theories and findings 
(e.g., Gigerenzer et al., 1989). And currently, bibliometric statistics transform 
judgments about scientists, their work, and scientific institutions themselves – 
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namely when it comes to “assessments” of “productivity”, “value”, or “quality”: 
quantitative science evaluation. The ongoing digitalization of Western societies 
potentiates this trend. 
2. In science and beyond, the routine uses of numbers cement social conventions 
(e.g., citation rates, h-indices, and p-values to evaluate scientists and their 
findings), aid governance and fuel beraucracization (e.g., governments and 
research instutions establishing databases to measure scientific “output”; Kostoff, 
1998). Numeric indicators seemingly aid establishing “objective” facts and 
“certainties”. Those, in turn, serve to justify decisions (e.g., about funding 
scientific work or hiring senior scientists), and, if need to be, also put decision 
makers (e.g., scientists, administrators, politicians) in a position to defend 
themselves (e.g., against being accused to have made arbitrary, biased, nepotistic, 
or otherwise flawed funding decisions). The ongoing digitalization shapes this 
trend, too. 
3. The advance of numbers as substitute for judgment is propelled by rather old 
ideals, including those of “rational, analytic decision making”, dating back, at 
least, to the Enlightenment. The past century has seen a new twist of those ideals, 
with much work in the decision sciences documenting how human judgment 
deviates from alleged goldstandards for rationality, this way trying to establish 
intuition’s flawed nature (e.g., Kahnemann, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). While the 
accent on human irrationality has further fuelled the advance of “objectifiers” – 
including measurement and numbers – it has also brought harm, namely by likely 
contributing to the blind – and often even mindless – routine use of seemingly 
“objective” indicators. 
4. We point towards antidotes against the harmful sideeffects of the increasing 
quantification of science evaluation: while the mindless use of indicators for 
seemingly “objective” evaluation is nowadays prevalent in virutally all branches of 
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science, within the decision sciences themselves, a novel view of how humans 
ought to make good judgments under uncertainty has gained impetus (Gigerenzer 
& Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999). In line 
with that view, we point out how the mindless use of numbers can be overcome if 
science evaluators and consumers of science evaluations learn to rely on a 
repertoire of simple decision strategies, called heuristics. Being statistically literate 
aids all three: (i) to know when to use which heuristic, (i) to understand when good 
human judgment ought to be trusted even when numbers speak against that 
judgment, and (iii) to realize why good human judgment and intuition is, at the end 
of the day, what matters, and that even when there is no number attached to it. Just 
like most of us immideatly grasp what the dark, empty eye sockets of the skulls of 
Greding and their message “What we are, you will turn into. What you are, we 
have been“ tell us, all without any number attached to those remnants of fathers, 
mothers, and children. 
In what follows, we will first sketch out the historical contexts and societal trends that 
have come with the increasing quantification of science and society. Second, we will turn to 
those developments’ latest outgrowth: the use of bibliometric statistics for research evaluation 
purposes. We close by calling for bringing sanity back into scientific judgment exercises and 
explain how relying on a repertoire of heuristics might aid doing so. 
Significant Numbers 
Numbers aid governance and fuel bureaucratization 
The quest for numbers is not new. Numbers, written on papyrus, coins or mile stones 
aid to govern societies and their activities – ranging from trade to war – since thousands of 
years. The Roman empire offers examples (Bowman, 2013; Vindolanda Tablets Online, 
2018). France, with Napoleon’s appetite for numbers (Bourguet, 1987), and the Prussian 
bureaucracy offer others. Numbers prepared the ground for modern welfare states, enabling to 
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compute contributions to pension funds or sickness benefits. Numbers lent arguments to 
political reformers and activists, including Karl Marx (Gigerenzer, 2008; Hacking, 1990). 
And modern states are unthinkable without them, with today’s tax offices, the FDA, the CIA, 
the EPA, and thousands of other institutions simply continuing the same old business: produce 
and interpret numbers to inform, make, and justify judgments. Indeed, the word statistics 
likely originates in states’ quest for economic, demographic or other data (Gigerenzer & 
Marewski, 2015). “Big data” is one of the latest outgrowths of those developments, in the 
future possibly leading to E-governance and digital democracy or, in the worst case, to the 
dictatorship of digitalized numbers as foreshadowed by China’s citizens score (e.g., Helbing, 
2015a; Helbing, 2015b; Helbing et al., 2017; Helbing & Pournaras, 2015). A development 
that can be summarized by Galileo Galilei’s famous lemma: measure what is measureable, 
and make measurable what is not; or, reformulated in political terms, control what is 
controllable and make controllable what is not. 
Numbers offer seemingly universal and automatic means to ends  
Measure what is measurable – indeed, leaving the nightmare of a government-steered 
or profit-driven big (data) brother aside, wouldn’t it be wonderful if it were possible to 
measure, analyze, and monitor everything, ranging up to the costs and benefits of tax payers’ 
investment in health care plans, environmental pollution, risks of genetic manipulation, and 
other thorny issues? Actually, is this not what we expect both scientists and public 
administrators to do? Nowadays, quite some people do. 
Using analysis and reason to understand and rule the world are old ideals. They can be 
found in the Enlightenment, espoused by thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Benjamin Franklin 
or by the enlightened Despot, Frederick the Great, King of Prussia. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
(1951) dream of a universal calculus that would allow translating ideas into symbols, and in 
so doing, permit to settle any kind of scientific dispute, beautifully illustrates those ideals, too: 
instead of guessing and arguing, let us simply sit down, and calculate! (Gigerenzer, 2014).  
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Modern echos of those old ideals are universalism and automatism (Gigerenzer & 
Marewski, 2015). Automatic refers to establishing “neutral”, “objective” measurement and 
quantitative evaluation procedures that – independent from the people using them – produce 
unbiased judgments for improving decision making. Universal refers to the dream of those 
automatic procedures to be applicable to all problems, independent of context. Omnipresent in 
all universal and automatic proceedures are numbers – numbers can be conveniently used 
independent of context (one can enumerate anything) and moreover, they seem to lend 
“objectivity” to observations that is independent of the observers (it does not matter who 
counts the number of words of this essay, everybody should arrive at the same number). 
In scientific research, a prominent example of universalism and automatism is the 
routine use of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) for all statistical inferences 
(Gigerenzer, 2004; Gigerenzer, Krauss, & Vitouch, 2004). Statistical inferences are 
judgments under uncertainty. In making those judgments, researchers in psychology, 
business, medicine, and economics blindly report p < .05, as if the p-value would not depend 
on their own intentions (see e.g., Kruschke, 2010, for dependencies of the p-value), or as if 
that number were equally informative for all judgment problems (see e.g., Forster, 2000; 
Gelman & Hennig, 2017; Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015; Marewski & Olsson, 2009, for a 
discussion of when different approaches to scientific inference can be informative). For 
instance, an estimated 99 p-values were computed, on average, per article in the Academy of 
Management Journal in 2012 (Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015). Similarly, Nature, Science, 
and other flagship journals fill their pages with p-values and double or triple stars (McCloskey 
& Ziliak, 1996; Schneider, 2015; Tressoldi, Giofre, Sella, & Cumming, 2013; Ziliak & 
McCloskey, 2004). 
Even the devine has been assessed with numbers – actually by means of the first 
known test of a null hypothesis (Gigerenzer et al., 2004). In 1710, John Arbuthnott noted that 
“the external Accidents to which are Males subject (who must seek their Food with danger) 
do make a great havock of them, and that this loss exceeds far that of the other Sex” 
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(Arbuthnott, 1710, p. 188). To counteract this trend, so he proposed “provident Nature, by the 
disposal of its wife Creator, brings forth more Males than Females” (p. 188), so that “every 
Male may have its Female” (p. 186). Using 82 years of birth records in London, John 
Arbuthnott asked whether chance or “Divine Providence” (p. 186) led to more male births 
than female ones. He concluded “that it is Art, not Chance that governs” (p. 189). The 
calculated “Expectation” (p. 188) of the observed excess of males, given chance was simply 
too small: p = (½)82. Put in modern terms, the probability p(D¦H) of the observed data, D, 
given the null hypothesis, H, was p > 000001. “From hence it follows”, he added, “Polygamy 
is contrary to the Law of Nature and Justice” (Arbuthnott, 1710, p. 189). 
About 200 years later, the Duke parapsychologist Rhine used statistics to establish 
extra-sensory perception, ESP, with “statistical luminaries” of the time defending the statistics 
used to make the case for ESP (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, p. 243). In the same century, the 
renounced statistician Lindley (1983), one of the most-outspoken advocates of a universal and 
automatic use of numbers, namely Bayesian statistics, writes: “We are uncertain about the 
inflation rate next year, the world’s oil reserves, or the possibility of nuclear accidents. All 
these can be handled by subjective probability” (pp. 10-11). And those “[b]ayesian methods 
are even more automatic” than Fisherian ones (Lindley, 1986, p. 6): “The Bayesian paradigm 
provides rules of procedure to be followed. I like to think of it as providing a recipe: a set of 
rules for attaining the final product. The recipe goes like this. What is uncertain and of interest 
to you? Call it θ. What do you know? Call it D, specific to the problem, and H, general. Then 
calculate p(θ|D, H). How? Using the rules of probability, nothing more, nothing less” 
(Lindley, 1983, p. 2). Seemingly, there are no limits to what scientists can do with numbers, 
and those numbers aid letting even bold claims look “objective”, rational, and hence, 
defendable. 
But not only scientists use automatic, universal statistics to make judgments; science 
itself is increasingly submitted to context-blind, number-driven inference. Here, an important 
example of universalism is the routine reliance on citation rates, h-indices, and impact factors 
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for making judgments about the “productivity” or “quality” of scientists, institutions, and 
scientific outlets, independent of context. Context can be the discipline, the research paradigm 
within a discipline, or the unit investigated (be it a teaching- or research-oriented professor or 
institution). Automatism in research evaluation takes the disguise of legal procedures that 
come, for instance, with faculty evaluation exercises. Citation rates, numbers of publication, 
journal impact factors and other numbers should “objectively” tell, independently of who 
conducts the evaluation, whether a scientist is worth hiring or worth a promotion. Which 
hiring committee-member, grant-application reviewer or advisory board panelist has not been 
confronted with page-long “evaluation guidelines” calling for those numbers in order to 
justify inferences about job candidates and potential grantees?  
What is more, thanks to the ongoing digitalization, today, automatic and universal 
statistics can be found everywhere. Outside of the world of research, incarnations of the old 
ideals of universalism and automatism are attempts to “measure” the environmental impact of 
different consumer goods (e.g., http://www.ghgprotocol.org/), to “assess” quality in health 
care (e.g., hospital ratings; see Wachter, 2016), or to “evaluate” education systems across 
countries (e.g. as per the Programme for International Student Assessment, PISA). We can 
learn, online, that the odds of dying from an asteroid impact are just 1 in 74,817,414 (Farber, 
2013); there is an iPhone App that passengers can consult, prior to embarking on their flight, 
to check their probability of “going down”. In this (brave) new digital world, is there any 
judgment that cannot be made from numbers? 
How numbers seem to replace judgement  
Numbers communicate reassuring objectivity, and aid to establish “facts”, even when 
it comes to the supernatural, the divine, or the uncertain future. Indeed, nowadays, scientists, 
politicians, doctors, and businessmen evoke numbers rather than hunches or gut feel to 
motivate and justify their thoughts about scientific ideas, spending policies, diseases, or 
mergers. We collect data on past financial returns to defend future investments, we use past 
survival rates to forecast a cancer patient’s chances of being alive in the future, and a 
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scientists’ publication output and citation rates serve to infer that scholar’s future 
performance, motivating tenure decisions. We even use the absence of numbers to make 
judgments, such when pointing out that few are known to have died from smoking (a few 
decades ago), or from living close to nuclear power plants (still today). Numbers, cast into 
statistics, equations, and algorithms, seem to allow us to control the uncertainties of the future 
and to justify present-day decisions. Numbers have, for the better or the worse, replaced mere 
“hunches” (Hoffrage & Marewski, 2015). 
This was not always so, and not in all contexts – and one does not have to go to times 
and places of shamanic rituals, religious fanaticism, or so-called superstitions for cases in 
point. Medicine, for instance, was based throughout centuries on the “medical tact” 
emphasizing the individual patient, with physicians objecting vehemently against summary 
statistics such as means. Only in the 20th century did probabilities and other numbers 
obtained from randomized trials displace physician’s clinical judgments (Gigerenzer et al., 
1989, chapter 2). Likewise, in the past century, patients’ common-sense intuitions such as Go 
to the doctor when it hurts! increasingly became overwritten by numbers, with the numbers 
sometimes contradicting the intuitions. Relative risks, as used in statements such as The risk 
of dying from breast cancer is reduced by 25% among women who participate in 
mammography screening! are a case in point; conducing healthy people to participate in 
massive cancer screening programs (Gigerenzer, 2014; Gigerenzer, Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, 
Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2008). 
Intelligence, measured by IQ and other numbers, is an invention of the 20th century, 
too; serving, for instance, U.S. military recruitment, immigration control, and dubious 
policies, with deficient mental test scores offering legal grounds for limiting access to 
education, and in some American states, even for sterilization (Gigerenzer et al., 1989, 
chapter 7). To be blamed are psychologists and the law-makers who believed them, turning 
mental numbers into seemingly objective, easy, and universal criteria to single out “bad 
pennies”. Multiple choice test scores, including the notorious SAT, GMAT, and other 
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universal, automatic indicators of scholastic aptitude, were absent from university education 
prior to those times. 
To give a final example, contrary to the Enlightenment’s focus on analysis, reason, 
and rationality, the great thinkers of the German epoch Sturm und Drang (ca. 1765-1785) 
placed emphasis on feelings, emotions, and their outward expression. Johann Wolfgang 
Goethe’s suicidal Werther reflects this mindset (Hoffrage & Marewski, 2015). Today, 
Werther would be placed into a psychiatric clinic, and self-respecting behavioral scientists 
prefer to study shamanism, religion, or the “emotional brain” rather than to letting themselves 
be guided by them. Not even those who study intuitive judgments – decision scientists – 
admit using intuition when it comes to assessing their own data and theories on intuition – and 
even less so when it comes to grading their students; without objective test scores, law suits 
loom on the horizon. 
Seemingly irrational behaviors and subjective, biased cognitions, ranging from 
feelings to intuitions, pose, however, prominent targets for investigation when it comes to 
documenting, correcting, and even exploiting them. This occurs in both science and in 
governance, with one informing and fueling the other. Starting in the 1970’s, Kahneman and 
Tversky’s heuristics-and-biases research program (e.g., Kahnemann et al., 1982) brought 
irrational, error-prone, and faulty judgment and decision making into thousands of journal 
pages, and onto administrators’ agendas. Many of those judgment biases were defined based 
on numbers; including by experiments showing how people’s judgments, seemingly, violated 
benchmarks for rationality such as the laws of probability in Bayes theorem (Gigerenzer, 
Hell, & Blank, 1988; Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987). In other 
research programs, statistics from behavioral studies fueled similar conclusions; namely that 
irrational citizens need outside help and steering. The libertarian paternalist movement’s 
emphasis on nudging ignorant people (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) is one prominent example. 
Also certain notions of egoistic homo economicus – who in the absence of punishment and 
control will inevitably maximize his utility, potentially at cost to others – fits the widespread 
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view that people’s subjective judgments cannot be trusted.1 The most recent outgrowth of the 
mistrust in good human judgement is the view that artificial intelligene will soon outperform 
human intelligence. 
In short, the old ideals of objectivity and universality have, over centuries, come to 
shape numerous domains in our society, ranging from religious believes to governance and 
research. Those ideal’s lifeblood are numbers: numbers can be applied universally and 
automatically, seemingly independent of context and people. The historic spread of numbers 
has, in more recent years, been associated with a negative conception of man’s ability to make 
good judgements all by himself. Judgements have to be unbiased; numbers can aid to 
objectify and, hence, justify them. 
Science evaluation 
How numbers fuel the quest for objective, unbiased, and justifiable judgment   
In 1987, Gigerenzer published a beautiful piece on the “fight against subjectivity” 
(Gigerenzer, 1987, p. 11), illustrating how, historically, the use of statistics became 
institutionalized in psychology, namely when experimenters started to invoke them to make 
their claims independent (i) from themselves as well as (ii) from the human subjects they 
studied. The fight against subjectivity is neither unique to psychology, nor has the struggle for 
objectivity ended in the social sciences. Across disciplines, scientists currently use numbers to 
make their claims about the value of their own and other’s scientific work appear independent 
from them and from context (see e.g., Gelman & Hennig, 2017). Academia, so we argue, is in 
the process of undergoing a dramatic transformation: as much as numbers have contributed to 
transform other aspects of science and society, they shape science evaluation. 
                                                 
1 Utility-maximizing economic models offer an example of how the ideal of universalism is actually reflected by 
scientific theories themselves. In corresponding economic models, utilities are expressed numerically such that, 
in principle, everything (ranging from costs and benefits coming with crime and punishment, marriage, fertility, 
altruisum, or discrimination) can be modelled with them (see e.g., Becker, 1976). And related models are not 
only prevealent in economics but also in other behavioral sciences, such as psychology (e.g., for learning; 
Anderson, 2007) or biology (e.g., for foraging; Stephens & Krebs, 1986). 
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What is being evaluated varies, ranging from individual journal articles to different 
“producers” of science, including scientists or competing departments and universities. For 
instance, many use, nowadays, the amount of citations a paper enlists on Google Scholar to 
find out whether that paper is worth citing and reading. Likewise, when it comes to justifying 
promotions of assistant professors or to allocating limited amounts of funds to competing 
departments, what frequently counts is the number of papers published in journals on the 
Financial Times List, the HEC Paris List, or in the top quarter of the Clarivate Analytics 
Journal Citation Reports. 
Similar statistics serve the general public and policy makers too, with tax payer’s 
investments in academic institutions, personnel, and research calling for indicators of success 
as justification. A frightening example is the Research Excellence Framework of the United 
Kingdom – a “system for assessing the quality of research in UK higher education 
institutions” (Research Excellence Framework, 2018), informing the general public about the 
quality of British science (e.g., for 2014, “the overall quality of submissions was judged 30% 
world-leading…, 46% internationally excellent…”, Research Excellence Framework, 2014b). 
The public website allows to search in a database, through different institution’s rating scores 
(e.g., “world-leading”), all the way down to individual scientists or citation counts for 
individual papers. From the mission statement: 
 “The … higher education funding bodies will use the assessment outcomes to 
inform the selective allocation of their grant for research to the institutions which 
they fund… 
 The assessment provides accountability for public investment in research and 
produces evidence of the benefits of this investment. 
 The assessment outcomes provide benchmarking information and establish 
reputational yardsticks, for use within the higher education (HE) sector and for 
public information” (Research Excellence Framework, 2014a). 
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Not only in the United Kingdom, but also in many other countries (e.g. Australia or 
the Netherlands), do those developments at the level of society feed and are fed by smart 
businessmen. Companies launch an ever increasing stream of off-the-shelves, user-friendly 
number producers, ranging from automatic citation counts (e.g., Google Scholar) and network 
apps (e.g., ResearchGate) to bibliometric products (InCites from Clarivate Analytics or 
SciVal from Elsevier) and plagiarism detection software. Also lawyers and journalists have 
their share, with the public outcries Corruption! Nepotism! or the latent threat of court trials 
(e.g., from job candidates) incentivising academic institutions to implement (e.g., resource 
allocation) procedures that are not, first and foremost, sensible, but that are defendable. The 
rationale of the number-based defenses is: numbers are harder to argue with than “subjective 
judgments”. 
The quantification of science evaluation has numerous consequences. Scientists seem 
to get more obsessed with achieving X journal publications per year than with simply 
producing research for the sake of producing compelling research, that is, on its own right 
(Paulus, Rademacher, Schäfer, Müller-Pinzler, & Krach, 2015). Instead of making one’s line 
of reasoning comprehensible to other researchers, papers are cited to boost one’s h-index, 
without much reflection about what those citations actually stand for (Tahamtan & 
Bornmann, 2018). And plagiarism software and its similarity indices invite graduate students 
to worry more about getting alarms from the software rather than about learning how to cite 
adequately. Indicators produce unintended consequences and replace thinking and insight 
(Waltman & van Eck, 2016). 
Those development strikingly resemble what Gigerenzer and others observed, decades 
earlier, for the quantification of social science research itself: there, p-value statistics started 
to spread when educational and parapsychologists wanted to make their claims (e.g., about 
extrasensory perception) look objective, and when textbook writers (e.g., Guilford, 1942) 
started to sell a mishmash of Ronald A. Fisher’s, Jerzy Neyman’s, and Egon Pearson’s 
competing statistical frameworks to social scientists without that those textbook writers 
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actually understood the statistics they sold (Gigerenzer, 2004; Gigerenzer et al., 2004; 
Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015). Journal editors picked up those writings. They found in p 
=.05 a seemingly universal and “objective criterion” for judging findings; and a few decades 
later, technology including off-the-shelf software such as SPSS, made assessing that criterion 
easy. The aftermath saw scientists worrying more about the magic .05 than about the 
soundness of theories, the quality of data, or the information conveyed by the p-value itself. In 
the social sciences, this way, NHST was born and institutionalized – a seemingly universal 
and automatic judgment procedure, applicable to all statistical problems independent of 
context and people. Few researchers realized or cared that they did not really understand the 
numbers produced by the testing, and even fewer noticed that the testing itself lacked 
coherent grounding in statistical theory or that there are, actually, three notions of level of 
significance (i.e., two from Fisher, one from Neyman and Pearson) all of which differ 
dramatically from NHST (Gigerenzer, 2004; Gigerenzer et al., 2004). 
How numbers fuel the bureaucratisation of science  
The quantification of science evaluation has not ended with mere efforts towards 
making judgments look unbiased, objective, and justifiable. The bureaucratization of science 
is another (equally worrisome) outcome. Modern science is frequently called post-academic. 
According to Ziman (2000), bureaucratization is an appropriate term which describes most of 
the processes in post-academic science: “It is being hobbled by regulations about laboratory 
safety and informed consent, engulfed in a sea of project proposals, financial returns and 
interim reports, monitored by fraud and misconduct, packaged and repackaged into 
performance indicators, restructured and downsized by management consultants, and 
generally treated as if it were just another self-seeking professional group” (p. 79). For 
example, principal investigators in Advanced Grants by the European Research Council 
(ERC) should be able to provide evidence for the calculation of their time spent on the ERC 
project – time sheets enter academia (European Research Council, 2012). 
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Words such as management, performance, contract, regulation, accountability, and 
employment had previously no place in scientific life. The vocabulary was not developed 
within science, but was transferred by the “modern”, bureaucratized society (Ziman, 2000). 
The bureaucratic virus spreads through the scientific publication process itself: nowadays, 
many journals require hosts of (e.g., web) forms to be signed (or ticked), ranging from 
“conflict of interest statements”, to “ethical regulations”, assurances that the data to be 
published is “new and original”, to copyright transfer agreements. Certain publication 
guidelines read like instructions one would otherwise find in tax forms in public 
administration.2 
Research in post-academic science is characterized by less freedom. Projects are 
framed by proposals, employment and supervision of project staff (PhD students, post-
doctoral researchers), and performance measurements which carry the risk that research is 
being condemned to operate in terms of “normal science” (Kuhn, 1962). The pressure to 
operate in terms of “normal science” leaves less space for serendipity and scientific 
revolutions. Explorative studies—which can lead to scientific revolutions—can raise 
questions that are new and not rooted in the field-specific literature; such studies can, 
moreover, come with unconventional approaches, and lead to unforeseeable expenditures of 
time (Holton, Chang, & Jurkowitz, 1996; Steinle, 2008). There is the risk that these elements 
are negatively assessed in grant funding and research evaluation processes, because they do 
not fit into “efficient” project management schemes. 
In short, the four most important characteristics of post-academic science evaluation 
can be summarized as follows (Moed & Halevi, 2015). 
(1) Performance-based institutional funding. In many European countries, the 
number of enrolled students is decreasingly and performance criteria are increasingly relevant 
for the amount of research funds for universities. The performance criteria are used for 
                                                 
2 Ironically, several decades ago, the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association indeed 
instructed its readers, to “treat the result section like an income tax return. Take what’s coming to you, but no 
more” (American Psychological Association, 1974, p. 19). 
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accountability purposes (Thonon et al., 2015). “In the current economical atmosphere where 
budgets are strained and funding is difficult to secure, ongoing, diverse and wholesome 
assessment is of immense importance for the progression of scientific and research programs 
and institutions” (Moed & Halevi, 2015, p. 1988). 
(2) International university rankings. Universities are confronted with the results of 
international rankings. Although heavily criticized (Hazelkorn, 2011), politicians are 
influenced by ranking numbers in their strategies for funding national science systems. There 
are even universities (e.g. in Saudi Arabia or China) incentivising behavior to influence their 
positions in rankings, for instance, by awarding nominal “visiting faculty” status to highly 
cited researchers from universities in other countries (Bornmann & Bauer, 2015). Clarivate 
Analytics publishes annually a list of researchers (at https://clarivate.com/hcr/) who have 
authored the most papers in their disciplines belonging to the 1% most frequently cited 
papers. This list is constitutive of one of the best known international rankings, the Academic 
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), also known as Shanghai Ranking. The Economist 
and the Financial Times undertake rankings of business schools and their Master, MBA, and 
Executive MBA programs. 
(3) Internal research assessment systems. More and more universities and funding 
agencies install research information systems to collect relevant data on research “output” 
(Biesenbender & Hornbostel, 2016). These numbers are used to monitor performance and 
efficiency continually. Problems emerge if those monitoring systems change researchers’ 
goals in an unintended way – for instance, leading them to dissect ideas into small publishable 
journal units, instead of creating comprehensive theory that would fill books. Equally 
problematic, the systems incentivize surfing the wave of “currently hot topics”, well-
established research paradigms and methodologies, instead of thinking out of the box, pulling 
together different areas of expertise, and risking for their work to be (initially) neither 
published nor popular or well-understood. The 2013 Nobel Prize laureate in physics, Peter W. 
Higgs, bluntly remarked, “Today I wouldn’t get an academic job … I don’t think I would be 
 19 
regarded as productive enough” (Aitkenhead, 2013). Indeed, prior to receiving the prize, so 
Higgs noted, he had become “an embarrassment to the department when they did research 
assessment exercises” (Aitkenhead, 2013). When requested his recent publications, “Higgs 
said, I would send back a statement: 'None'” (Aitkenhead, 2013). 
(4) Performance-based salaries. In several countries (e.g. China, India, Portugal, 
Czech Republic) salaries are sometimes connected to publishing X articles in reputable 
journals (e.g. Science, Nature) (Reich, 2013). In business schools, it is common to link a 
reduced teaching load, promotions and other benefits to publishing in journals on the 
Financial Times List – the same newspaper that publishes the MBA and other rankings 
important to the schools’ prestige and, ultimately, to profitability of their programs. Such 
practices widely open the doors to scientific misconduct (Bornmann, 2013b). One is not really 
be surprised to read that papers are bought from online brokers or that scientists pay for 
authorships (Hvistendahl, 2013). 
Why numbers alone are not sufficient when it comes to research evaluation 
According to Wilsdon et al. (2015), today three broad approaches are mostly used to 
assess research in post-academic science: the metrics-based model, which relies on 
quantitative measures (e.g. counts of publications, prices, or funded projects), peer review 
(e.g., of journal or grants), and the combination of both approaches. Standards in science, so 
the rationale of the peer review process goes, can only be established if research designs and 
results are assessed by peers from the same or a related field. In the past decades, the quest for 
comparative and continuous evaluations on a higher aggregation level (e.g., institutions, 
countries) has fueled preferences for the metrics-based model. Those preferences are also 
triggered by the overload of the peer review system: the demand for the participation in peer 
review processes exceeds the supply. 
In the metrics-based model of research evaluation, bibliometrics has a prominent 
position (Schatz, 2014; Vinkler, 2010). According to Wildgaard, Schneider, and Larsen 
(2014) “a researcher’s reputational status or ‘symbolic capital’ is to a large extent derived 
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from his or her ‘publication performance’” (p. 126). Bibliometric information is available in 
large databases (e.g. Web of Science, WoS, provided by Clarivate Analytics and Scopus from 
Elsevier) and can be used, seemingly flexibly, in many disciplines and on different 
aggregation levels (e.g. single papers, researchers, research groups, institutions, countries). 
Whereas the number of publications is used as an indicator for production (i.e., productivity), 
the number of citations is relied upon as proxy for quality. 
However, the metrics-based model has several pitfalls (Hicks, Wouters, Waltman, de 
Rijcke, & Rafols, 2015). Five of those problems stem from the ways in which numbers are 
used (Bornmann, 2017). 
(1) Skew in bibliometric data. Bibliometric data tend to be right-skewed, with there 
being only a few highly-cited publications and many publications with only a few or zero 
citations (Seglen, 1992). The “bibliometric law” says that there is a tendency for items (here: 
citations) to concentrate on a relatively small stratum of sources (here: publications; de Bellis, 
2009). Citations are over-dispersed count data (Ajiferuke & Famoye, 2015). Hence, simple 
arithmetic means – as they are built into mean citation rates or journal impact factors (JIFs, 
measuring the mean citation impact of a journal) – should be avoided as measure of central 
tendency (Glänzel & Moed, 2013). 
(2) Variability in bibliometric data. In line with the ideals of universalism and 
automatism, the results of bibliometric studies are typically published as if they were 
independent of context or otherwise invariant (Waltman & van Eck, 2016). Single highly-
cited publications (“outliers” of sorts) can have a great influence on the results, and the results 
of bibliometric studies can vary between different samples (e.g. from different publication 
periods or literature databases). 
(3) Time- and field-dependencies of bibliometric data. Many bibliometric studies 
are based on bare citation counts, although these numbers cannot be used for cross-field and 
cross-time comparisons (of researchers or universities). Different publication and citation 
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cultures lead to different average citation rates in the fields – independently of the quality of 
the publications. 
(4) Language effect in bibliometric data. In bibliometric databases, English 
publications dominate. Since English is the most frequently used language in science 
communication, the prevalence of English publications comes as no real surprise. However, 
the prevalence can influence research evaluation in practice. For example, there is a language 
effect in citation-based measurements of university rankings, which discriminates, 
particularly, against German and French institutions (van Raan, van Leeuwen, & Visser, 
2011). Publications not written in English receive – as a rule – fewer citations than 
publications in English. 
(5) Missing and/or incomplete databases in certain disciplines. Bibliometric 
analyses can be poorly applied in certain disciplines (e.g., social sciences, humanities, 
computer science). The most important reason is that the literature from these disciplines are 
insufficiently covered in the major citation databases which focus on journal publications 
(Marx & Bornmann, 2015). For example, computer scientists tend to publish most of their 
work in conference proceedings rather than in journals. In other words, “bibliometric 
assessment of research performance is based on one central [but false] assumption: scientists, 
who have to say something important, do publish their findings vigorously in the open, 
international journal literature” (van Raan, 2008, p. 463). 
Two additional problems with bibliometric indicators concern our understanding of 
numbers and of what information numbers can convey. 
(1) Poorly understood indicators. Similarly to what happened with p-value and other 
inferential (e.g., Bayesian) statistics (e.g., Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015), many of those 
relying on bibliometric indicators do not seem to know how to use them in meaningful ways, 
or what the numbers really mean. The JIF is a widely used indicator to infer “the impact” of 
single publications by a researcher. However, the indicator was originally developed to decide 
on the importance of holding journals in libraries. Paralleling how Fisher’s and von Neyman 
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and Pearson’s respective statistical frameworks became alienated from their intended 
purposes (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2004; Gigerenzer et al., 2004; Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015), the 
JIF was applied, with little conceptual fundament, to new tasks – judgments about the quality 
or relevance of scientific output. Similarly problematic, the h-index combines the output and 
citation impact of a researcher in a single number. However, with h papers having at least h 
citations each, the formula for combining both metrics is arbitrarily chosen: h2 citations or 2h 
citations could have been used as well; just as p > .06 or > .02 could have defined statistical 
significance instead of the arbitrary .05 and .01.3 
Until the end of the 20th century, bibliometrics was frequently conducted by experts in 
bibliometrics who knew about the typical problems with bibliometric studies, alongside with 
possible solutions. Since then “desktop scientometrics” (Katz & Hicks, 1997, p. 141) has 
become more and more popular. Here, research managers, administrators, and scientists from 
fields other than bibliometrics use “bibliometric data in a quick, unreliable manner” (Moed & 
Halevi, 2015, p. 1989). Bibliometric applications are sold by Clarivate Analytics (InCites) and 
Elsevier (SciVal), which provide ready-to-use productivity and impact indicators, foregoing 
available expertise and scrutiny from professional bibliometricians (Leydesdorff, Wouters, & 
Bornmann, 2016). As Retzer and Jurasinski (2009) point out – rightly – “a review of a 
scientist’s performance based on citation analysis should always be accompanied by a critical 
evaluation of the analysis itself” (p. 395). Bibliometric applications, like SciVal or InCites, 
can deliver bibliometric results, but they cannot replace human judgement and expertise. 
(2) Impact is not equal to quality. A citation-based indicator might capture (some) 
aspects of quality, but is not able to accurately measure quality –indicators are “largely built 
on sand”, in the view of some (Macilwain, 2013, p. 255). According to Martin and Irvine 
(1983) citations reflect scientific impact as just one of three aspects of quality: correctness and 
importance are the other two. Applicability and real world relevance are further aspects 
scarcely reflected in citations. Moreover, revolutionary findings – those, indeed, leading, to 
                                                 
3 Indeed, we likely use .05 and .01 today, only because Fisher did not have any tables for other numbers – his 
archenemy, Karl Pearson, appeared to have refused to share those with him (Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015). 
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scientific revolutions – are not necessarily highly cited ones. For example, Marx and 
Bornmann (2010) and Marx and Bornmann (2013) bibliometrically analyzed publications that 
were decisive in revolutionizing our thinking, such as those (1) that replaced the static view 
with Big Bang theory in cosmology, or (2) that dispensed with the prevailing fixist point of 
view (fixism) in favor of a dynamic view of the Earth where the continents move through the 
Earth’s crust. As those bibliometric analyses show, several publications that propelled the 
transition from one theory to another are lowly cited. 
What is more, in all areas of science, important publications might be recognized as 
such only many years after publication – these articles are like sleeping beauties, only that – 
unlike in fairy tales – nobody starts to kiss them (Ke, Ferrara, Radicchi, & Flammini, 2015; 
van Raan, 2004). The Shockley-Queisser paper (Shockley & Queisser, 1961) – describing the 
limited efficiency of solar cells on the basis of absorption and reemission processes – is one 
such sleeping beauty (Marx, 2014). This groundbreaking paper was rarely cited within the 
first 40 years after its publication. While initial lack of recognition can be compensated, in the 
long run, by exploding citation rates, the time, resources, and tenure-cases lost until those 
kisses, finally, produce themselves might be harder to make up for. Even worse, sometimes 
papers that are highly cited perpetuate factual mistakes, miconceptions, or misunderstandings 
contained in them. For instance, a highly cited paper by Preacher and Hayes (2008) 
recommends using a certain statistical procedure to test mediation. This procedure is widely 
used in the disciplines of psychology and management; however, this procedure actually 
produces biased statistical estimates because it ignores a key assumption made by the 
estimator (i.e., that the mediator is not endogenous; see Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & 
Lalive, 2010; Kline, 2015; Shaver, 2005; Smith, 2012). 
Science evaluation from a statistical point of view: Universal and automatic classifiers 
do not exist 
The problem with recognizing quality science is that – statistically-speaking – 
judgments about the quality of research (or people or institutions) represent classifications. As 
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any classifier, also indicator-based classifications will never yield perfect results.4 Instead, 
correct positives (giving “good research” good evaluations) and correct negatives (giving 
“bad research” bad evaluations), false positives (giving “bad research” good evaluations) and 
false negatives (giving “good research” bad evaluations) will occur (Bornmann & Daniel, 
2010). To develop accurate classifiers, in areas other than science evaluation, one tests, out of 
sample, different classification (i.e., judgement) algorithms in model comparisons. This can 
be done, for example, in medical diagnosis (e.g., Marewski & Gigerenzer, 2012). Yet, in 
science evaluation that approach is not feasible for at least three reasons. 
First, in order to determine classification (i.e., the judgements’) accuracy one needs to 
have a criterion variable, which does not exist in research evaluation. That is, one does not 
really know for sure how good research is, given a valid outside yardstick. In certain areas of 
medical diagnosis, in contrast, it is relatively more straightforward to establish outside 
criteria. HIV, a cancer, or a bacterium might be present or not; if present and if the classifier 
predicts the medical condition to be present, one has a correct positive, if not present, and if 
the classifier predicts the condition to be present, one has a false positive, and so on. 
Second, even if there were clear-cut, meaningful criteria in research evaluation, 
different operationalization of them can result in different classifiers coming out as winner in 
model comparisons. In any classification problem, what classifier maximizes classification 
accuracy depends on the criteria chosen, the predictor variables, the sample at hand, as well as 
other factors – there is simply no universally adequate classifier. Hence, there is also no 
universally “correct” way how to design a classfier, for instance, how to fix the size of the 
calibration and test samples needed to develop and test a classfier. But following the old 
ideals of universalism and automatism, many treat citation counts, JIFs, and other 
                                                 
4 The various indicators (e.g., citation rates, JIF, h-index) alluded to above can be thought of predictor variables 
to be used in the “classification” of research output, people, or institutions. That said, even if it were possible to 
improve those predictor variables, the three problems listed below (lack of criterion variable, inexistence of 
universally accurate classifiers, unknown cost-benefit tradeoffs) still prevail. For instance, the suggestion to use 
citation percentiles instead of mean citation rates (Bornmann, 2013a) and to field-normalized citation counts 
(Waltman, 2016) does not solve those three problems. Much the same can be said with respect to other problems 
we did not even mention, including problems related to the interpretation of releveant statistical relations, such 
as the notorious confusion of correlation and causation (Glänzel, 2010). 
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bibliometric variables as if they could be used as “classifiers” that were informative in all 
situations and their classifications independent of how different people used them. 
Third, when it comes to research evaluation the criterion one ought to be interested in 
is actually not just (likely unmeasurable) classification accuracy, but the costs and benefits 
associated with correct positives, correct negatives, false negatives, and false positives. What 
is the cost (e.g., to society, the taxpayer, the individual scientist) if just one brilliant, 
groundbreaking piece of work is classified as “bad”, or if millions of trivial findings are 
classified as “good” (e.g., simply because they are cited)? In science evaluation and many 
other classification tasks, the “real” cost and benefit of classifications are hard to estimate or 
fully unknowable. Even in medicine, where costs and benefits are sometimes knowable, it is 
not always clear how they ought to be traded off against each other.5 
Even if one worked with fully hypothetical costs-benefit structures, different 
stakeholders will place more or less importance on different costs and benefits (e.g., different 
scientists, evaluators, or politicians might have different agendas when it comes to evaluating 
the research of their colleagues, institutions, or themselves). Assumptions about cost-benefit 
structures will, too, differ across contexts (e.g., a false negative in cancer research is not the 
same as one in social psychology). But with each change in the assumed cost-benefit 
structure, the performance of each classifier can change. Statistically speaking, universal and 
automatical classifiers do not exist. 
                                                 
5 To illustrate this point, the costs that come with a false-negative mammogram will cleary outweigh the costs 
come with a false-positive result, so all women should regularly participate in breast cancer screening, one might 
think. Indeed, doctors, lobbyists, politicians, and other professionals argue they should, and a billion dollar-
generating business lives from national screening programs. Yet, out of 1,000 women, aged 50 years and older, 
who participate in breast cancer screening for 10 years on average, 100 will experience severe costs, including 
false alarms, biopsies or psychological distress, and 5 with non-progressive cancer will have unnecessary 
treatment (e.g., complete or partial breast removal). Of those 1,000 women, 4 will die from breast cancer, and 21 
will die from any type of cancer. To compare, of those women who do not undergo breast cancer screening, 5 
will die from breast cancer, and 21 from any type of cancer, and there will be no screening-related costs (e.g., 
unnecessary biopsies, treatment) (Gigerenzer, 2014). Now, is the reduction from 5 to 4 women who will die from 
breast cancer – which is, actually, the 25% risk reduction mentioned above – “worth” the costs of screening? 
Moreover, take opportunity costs into account: tax money poured into screening programs cannot be spent on 
other purposes, such as cancer prevention programs, traffic education, or environmental protection. Having 
numbers can help to see how difficult the problem is; but even so, numbers do not, on their own, solve what is a 
problem of judgment. 
 26 
What is the remedy? Understand that heuristics are tools for 
judgements under uncertainty, including for science evaluation 
In the introduction to this essay, we wrote that numbers have been turned into the new 
opium of the people. We did not write that they are opium. Opium is a dangerous drug; 
numbers are not drugs, but they can cloud one’s thinking and affect one’s emotional state like 
drugs. Similar to many drugs, numbers can do not only harm but, when insightfully and 
diligently used, can actually be quite beneficial. 
So let us be clear: we do not advocate to get rid of numbers in judgement. From 
experimentation to computer simulation, for most scientific judgments, numbers are 
indispensable – also when it comes to science evaluation. For instance, in playing the devil’s 
advocate, one could ask why a numeric indicator for gauging the quality of publications is 
necessary; one could simply read the publications and assess their quality (Gigerenzer & 
Marewski, 2015). However, such a practice would not be possible in large-scaled evaluations 
of (competing) research units. Furthermore, large research projects are often transdisciplinary. 
Experts would be necessary to assess the quality of each single publication. If one did not 
want to trust bibliometric indicators, one would thus either have to recruit the experts, or 
forego large-scale evaluations in the first place.6 
What we do advocate is that those who invoke numbers to assess the “quality” of 
research, people, or institutions do not pretend, at the same time, to also avoid the 
uncertainties that come with any judgment. Likewise, we advocate that those who dare to rely 
on their judgment are not automatically forced to make up numbers (“facts”) even when doing 
so does not make any sense. In our view, the Enlightenment’s (i.e., Kant’s) Sapere audere! – 
                                                 
6 Another problem with expert judgments concerns communication: As Hug, Ochsner, and Daniel (2014) point 
out, “scholars possess knowledge, which allows them to recognize quality research; however, they cannot 
articulate this knowledge clearly and easily” (p. 61). Polanyi (1967) calls this situation tacit knowing which 
refers to “the fact that we can know more than we can tell” (p. 4). Gigerenzer (2014) calls such inarticulate, 
unconscious reasons intuition and points out that many experts (e.g., in business, medicine, and beyond) feel 
compelled to invent numbers, facts, and arguments after the fact – only to justify their gut feelings to distrusting 
individuals or for accountability purposes. 
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dare to know – ought to come accompanied with a Invite good human judgment! How can this 
become common practice in science evaluation? 
Many believe, the more information available, the better. And if only little information 
is out there, one should, ideally, go out and seek more. Once all facts are on the table, one can 
then sit down and integrate them all in order find the best solution. This classic view, rooted 
in the Enlightenment’s focus on analysis goes strong in many areas of psychology, 
economics, the information sciences, and beyond. Yet, science evaluation and the vast 
majority of other judgment tasks we face in our private and professional life do not resemble 
gambles of chance. In gambles of chance, all information is knowable or can be reliably 
estimated, and nothing unexpected will happen. 
In dice-throwing, roulette, and card games, for example, it is possible to calculate the 
probabilities of different outcomes, and the consequences of those outcomes are known. 
Outcomes when throwing an unbiased dice are the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, with each 
outcome having an equal probability of occurring: 1/6 is the relative frequency in the long 
run. Similarly, when playing roulette, one knows what is at stake: as a consequence of an 
outcome, one can either lose or win the money on the table; or in the case of Russian roulette 
with two guns, the only four possible consequences are (i) a bullet in one’s skull, (ii) a bullet 
in the opponent’s skull, (iii) a bullet in both skulls, (iv) a bullet in no skull. 
In science and everyday life, in contrast, surprises can occur and there is an unknown 
amount of unknown unknowns: Do we know the range of possible things that might happen 
to us tomorrow, next week, or in ten years from now? Do we know which technology will be 
invented tomorrow? Is it knowable how many scientists who are not “productive” enough by 
yearly publication numbers, will in five, ten, fifteen years from now, make the discovery that 
revolutionizes their field? Gigerenzer (e.g., 2014) uses the term uncertainty to refer to the 
common situation where not all outcomes, their consequences, and probabilities of 
occurrences are knowable. When they are knownable, one speaks of risk. Situations of risk 
invite for trying to find, through calculation or logic, best solutions to given judgment tasks. It 
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is those rare situations of knowable risks, where more information and optimal information 
integration yields better judgments.7 
Uncertainty, in turn, affords relying on simple rules of thumb that allow making good-
enough judgments based on little information, so called fast-and-frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer 
et al., 1999). The fast-and-frugal heuristics research program underlines that people can make 
smart decisions, because they can adaptively draw from a repertoire of strategies, including 
multiple heuristics for judgments under uncertainty and other more complex strategies (e.g., 
Bayesian ones) for decisions under risk (see Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Katsikopoulos, 
2011; Marewski, Gaissmaier, & Gigerenzer, 2010, for overviews). In contrast to those other 
strategies, heuristics purposefully ignore information, both simplying decision making and 
leading to (reasonably) fast judgments (hence frugal and fast). Importantly, under uncertainty, 
a trade-off between simplicity and accuracy is not necessarily incurred; to the contrary, 
ignoring information is often key to making good judgments, as numerous computer 
simulations and mathematical analyses suggest (e.g., Czerlinski, Gigerenzer , & Goldstein, 
1999; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009). Selecting adaptively from a toolbox of judgment 
strategies implies that not all tools are used in all situations, neither are they useful 
universally. Instead, each of the different tools in the repertoire can help only in certain 
situations. Knowing when to rely on which tool is at the heart of the art of clever decision 
making. 
For instance, why and when various fast-and-frugal heuristics can help making good 
judgments under uncertainty can be explored in terms of what is known, in statistics, as the 
bias-variance dilemma (Geman, Bienenstock, & Doursat, 1992; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 
                                                 
7 Indeed, as the reader might have noticed, throughout this essay, we have never used the term risk; instead we 
have been referring to judgments under uncertainty from the start. The notions of risk and uncertainty in decision 
making as Gigerenzer (e.g., 2014; Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014) and we (e.g., Hafenbrädl, Waeger, Marewski, 
& Gigerenzer, 2016) use them have been developed based on the work of Knight (1921) and others (e.g., 
Savage, 1954) and can be distinguished from other (related) notions in different disciplines (see e.g., Bookstein, 
1997, for an example from informetrics). Specifically, risk refers to situations in which probabilities can be 
reliably estimated or are known, such as the gambles of chance mentioned above (e.g., roulette, card games, 
lotteries) which represent predicable and well-defined problems. The notion of small worlds, put forward by the 
father of modern Bayesian decision theory, Savage (1954), too, refers to such settings of perfect information. 
Uncertainty, in turn, comes with unknown, unknowable, or mathematically imprecise probabilities – fuzzy 
situations that Binmore (2009) dubbed large (or uncertain) worlds. 
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2009). Calculable risks, in turn, can afford for being tackled with seemingly automatic and 
universal quantitative procedures. Bayes theorem is just one of them; the maximization of 
(subjective expected) utility (e.g., Edwards, 1954), as it is also assumed to drive the egoistic 
homo economicus, is another. Calculable risks can also afford measuring how much actual 
human behavior deviates from normatively “optimal” (e.g., Bayesian) solutions – and, hence, 
for classifying behavior as suboptimal or irrational whenever that behavior does not live up to 
the calculated expectations (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2015).8 
Unfortunately, in the past century, too much social science research has, rather than 
investigating genuine tools for judgments under uncertainty and finding out when each of 
those tools works, vainly attempted to reduce uncertainty to risk (see Gigerenzer & Marewski, 
2015; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987).9 As a result, many academics do not only seem to treat 
science evaluation and statistics as if there were just one type of universal tool available (e.g., 
h-index for all assessments of researchers or NHST for all statistical inference), but also the 
idea that simple, intuitive rules – folk wisdom of sorts, such as Do not put your eggs into the 
same basket!, Split your resources equally!, Take the best! (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2014; 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999) – could outwit detailed analysis in the first place seems 
counterintuitive to many. 
In short, in many ways, the Enlightenment’s ideals continue to go strong. But the 
ideals start breaking down when one accepts the world as what it really is: uncertain. Under 
uncertainty, heuristics can outperform more complex judgment procedures – be it when it 
                                                 
8 For instance, following the heuristics-and-biases framework mentioned above, behaviour that deviates from the 
maximization of subjective expected utility and other normative yardsticks (e.g., the rules of logic) is considered 
irrational, biased, or otherwise fallacious. 
9 Under uncertainty, as Gigerenzer and we (e.g., Hafenbrädl et al., 2016) use the term, surprises can occur: the 
decision maker does not know all options, their consequences, and the probabilities of those consequences 
occurring, and/or the available information does simply not allow to reliably estimate those. In such situations, 
the premises of rational (e.g., Bayesian) decision theory are not met, and classic (e.g., optimization) approaches 
to decision making and human rationality are rendered inappropriate. Traceable to the Enlightenment and to 
thinkers such as Blaise Pascal, Pierre Fermat, and Daniel and Nicholas Bernoulli, those classic approaches to 
decision making still dominate much thinking in science (e.g., notably economics, biology, psychology) and 
society, namely when decision making problems that entail uncertainty (or risk and uncertainty at the same time) 
are treated as if they just entailed (calculable) risk. In the social sciences, prominent examples and derivatives of 
those classic approaches are not only the above-mentioned maximization of (subjective) expected utility and 
Bayesian inference models (e.g., Arrow, 1966; Becker, 1993; Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Edwards, 1954; Savage, 
1954; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), but also widely used statistical tools (e.g.,linear models that estimate 
coefficients while minimizing errors). 
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comes to medical diagnosis, sports forecasting, financial investment, criminal investigations, 
or election polling to name but a few (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer, 
Hertwig, & Pachur, 2011; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2009; Hafenbrädl et al., 2016). We think 
that heuristics could improve the uncertain world of science, too – namely (i) by transforming 
the workings of science as a social system and (ii) by aiding people’s judgments about 
science. 
Regarding the first point, imagine only how academia would look like if all 
researchers followed the simple heuristics to only use statistics in result sections that they 
fully comprehend? Regarding the first point, imagine only how academia would look like if 
all researchers followed the simple heuristics to only cite those papers they have really read 
and understood (see e.g., Penders, 2018), or to only use statistics in result sections that they 
fully comprehend? Such simple rule could be backed-up by others. An example is Avoid silo-
thinking; that is, also search for knowledge outside of your own discipline! Often similar 
questions are asked in different disciplines, with similar notions being given different labels 
(see Arkes & Ayton, 1999; Marewski & Link, 2014, for examples concerning psychology and 
economics). A punchline for a simple rule for science evaluation would be to require science 
evaluators – much like along the lines of the Harnack Principle practiced at the Max Planck 
Society (Max Planck Society, 2018) – to actually read and reflect upon the papers of those 
they evaluate: Only use citation-based indicators alongside expert judgements of papers, and 
those papers have to be carefully read and understood)! A result of that rule would be that 
those evaluating others would have to be experts in the very same area – instead of generalists 
who can, at best, only judge the “quality” of work from the outside by relying on citation and 
publication numbers or other seemingly universal indicators. Hence, science administrators 
always would have to integrate expert judgements in evaluations. 
As to the second point – to aid judgment about science – the difficulty and beauty of 
science evaluation lies in knowing when to use which indicator. Contrary to what many 
science evaluators do, who pretend to apply single indicators (e.g., h-indices) universally, 
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there is no single indicator that can be meaningfully applied to all problems. There is also no 
indicator that will lend results automatically, that is, indepent of the person or institution using 
it. Moreover, in many situations, there will be no clear answer whether using a specific 
indicator is “right” vs. “wrong” or “optimal” vs. “suboptimal”; instead judgment is required 
and uncertainty will prevail.  
Finally, one should not always prefer advanced indicators over simple ones and vice 
versa. For instance, citation counts and other simple indicators can be helpful when 
considered within a single scientific field, such that there is no need for field normalization 
(see footnote 4); particularly citation counts are easy to understand and therefore it is 
relatively easy for end-users to recognize the problems and limitations that come with citation 
count-based judgments (Waltman & van Eck, 2016). 
We like to think of science evaluation in terms of judgments under uncertainty that can 
be best tackled if one is prepared to choose – with all uncertainty – from a repertoire of 
different techniques – including different indicator and non-indicator based ones. The 
challenge consists of selecting techniques that yield satisfactory results. Nobel laurate Herbert 
Simon (e.g., 1956, 1990) developed the notion of satisficing: the idea is not to aspire 
identifying the optimal option from a set, but one that is sufficiently good to meet the goal. 
Aspiring to select sufficiently good heuristics, and knowing that, in so doing “mistakes” are 
inevitable, is what science evaluation under uncertainty ought to be about. That view 
corresponds to the fast-and-frugal heuristics approach to decision making introduced above. It 
also resembles the toolbox view of statistitics (e.g., Gigerenzer & Marewski, 2015): rather 
than pretending that the statistical toolbox contained just one type procedure for making 
statistical inferences – be it NHST for frequentists or Bayesian procedures for Bayesians – 
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meaingful statistics can be best conceived of in terms of a repertoire of different statistical 
tools which many of them being useful in quite different situations.10 
Let expertise in the research field and expertise in bibliometrics inform the selection of 
heuristics from the toolbox 
Consistent with a toolbox view on judgment and statistics, expertise can aid decision 
making, namely when it comes to deciding which of the various tools to rely upon. At least 
two kinds of expertise are necessary if metrics are used by administrators. 
First, judgments made by a field’s experts are necessary to interpret the numbers in a 
bibliometric report and to place them in the institutional and field-specific context. When 
conducting a bibliometric evaluation of a scientist, journal, or an institution, judgments should 
be made within the field, and not by people outside of that area of research. This is what the 
notion of informed peer review is about: “the idea [is] that the judicious application of 
specific bibliometric data and indicators may inform the process of peer review, depending on 
the exact goal and context of the assessment. Informed peer review is in principle relevant for 
all types of peer review and at all levels of aggregation” (Wilsdon et al., 2015, p. 64). 
Heuristics are – much like science evaluation should be – context depedent, and knowing the 
context well can aid to select satisfactory heuristics. 
Second, expertise in a field ought to be combined with expertise in bibliometrics. 
Much like a non-physician or a non-pilot should not attempt to diagnose patients or fly 
airplanes even if convenient diagnosis tools are sold on the internet or if flight simulation 
software is readily available, staff with insufficient bibliometric expertise (e.g., 
administrators) should not be put in positions where those non-experts have to assess units 
                                                 
10 NHST, for instance, is useful in situations when there is little knowledge about the phenomenon to tbe studied 
and precise competing hypotheses cannot be formulated. Using Bayes’ rule makes sense when priors can be 
reliably estimated. Yet other situations may warrant completely different tools – ranging from exploratory data 
analysis to out-of-sample tests of competing custom-built models, exhausitive graphical data analysis, or the 
simplest of descriptive statistics. 
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(e.g. scientists or institutions) – even if freely available bibliometric tools such as InCites or 
SciVal seemingly make those tasks simple.11 
Professional bibliometricians do not only have access to a repertoire of different 
databases and indicators and are used to choosing among their tools, but they may also advise 
the client against a bibliometric report in cases where bibliometrics can be scarcely applied 
(e.g. in the humanities) or point to other problems alongside with possible solutions. Hicks et 
al. (2015) formulated 10 principles – the Leiden Manifesto – which guide experts in the field 
of scientometrics (see also Bornmann & Haunschild, 2016). For example, performance should 
be measured against the research missions of the institution, group or researcher (principle no. 
2) or the variation by field in publication and citation practices should be considered by using 
field-normalized citation scores in cross-field evaluations (principle no. 6). Thus, if a report is 
commanded from bibliometricians, the responsible administrator should try to understand the 
report by discussing it with the bibliometricians.  
Become statistically literate in order to evaluate and communicate about different tools 
for science evaluation 
A toolbox approach to science evaluation calls for more than just expertise in 
bibliometrics and in the domain of research. Any individual involved with research evaluation 
ought to increase her knowledge on statistics and data analysis techniques. It is, at the end of 
the day, the comprehension of numbers that will help administrators to discuss bibliometric 
reports with the bibliometricians and scientists from the field, and it is the comprehension of 
numbers that will aid administrators to see the bibliometric report’s limitations. Similarly, it is 
statistical knowledge that allows playing the devil’s advocate on numbers provided by others 
or compiled by oneself. Notably, social scientists should know how to program computer 
simulations to scrutinize their own judgments and classifications. Just imagine what would 
                                                 
11 Thor, Marx, Leydesdorff, and Bornmann (2016) introduced the program CRExplorer (see 
www.crexplorer.net) which forces the application of bibliometrics by experts in the field of evaluation. The user 
of the program has to select and import the publications on which citation impact is measured. The program 
counts the cited references in these publications to identify the most influential works. Without a carefully 
selected publication set as import—which can only be done with the necessary expertise—the results of the 
program become meaningless. 
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happen if everybody followed the simple rule of thumb to only rely on numbers (e.g., Bayes 
factors, p-values, bibliometric indicators) and quantitative models (e.g., regressions, 
classification trees) they are able to fully program from scratch themselves, that is, without 
any help of off-the-shelf software (e.g., SPSS) and without making use of their pre-
programmed functions? Likely there would be all five: more reading, more thinking, more 
informed discussions about contents, less uninformed abuse of numbers, and more experts in 
bibliometrics and statistics.  
Scientists and science evaluators ought to be familiar with basic statistical principles 
for statistical reasoning under uncertainty, such as testing one’s predictions on data that 
differs from the data that served the development of the predictions, that is, out of sample or 
out of population (e.g., Marewski & Olsson, 2009; Pitt, Myung, & Zhang, 2002; Roberts & 
Pashler, 2000). To give another example, evaluators should be familiar with different 
techniques of exploring, representing, visualizing, and communicating data and results, 
ranging from effect size displays to natural frequencies (Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig, & 
Gigerenzer, 2000).12 Seeing the same numbers presented in different ways is key to 
understanding them. Indeed, in basic research on fast-and-frugal heuristics and statistics, 
repertoires of different judgmental and statistical “tools” are not simply “invented”, but 
instead the performance of different “tools” is investigated in extensive mathematical analyses 
and/or computer simulations. By analogy, science evaluators ought to be sufficiently familiar 
with data analysis techniques in order to be able to evaluate their own tools for science 
evaluation. For instance, evaluators ought to understand the parallels between science 
evaluations and any statistical classification problem, as described in the section „Science 
evaluation from a statistical point of view“. Science Evaluators ought to know the statistics 
                                                 
12 Natural frequencies, for instance, offer a transparent format to describe the outcomes of classifications; less 
transparent formats are fractions and percentages. Take breast cancer screening as example (see Gigerenzer, 
Gaissmaier, Kurz-Milcke, Schwartz, & Woloshin, 2007). What is the likelihood that a woman, who gets a 
positive mammogram, has cancer? The probability is about 10%, if the breast cancer screening mammogram has 
a sensitivity of 90%, and a false-positive rate of 9%, with the prevalence of breast cancer being 1%. Confused? 
Here, are the same statistics, this time represented as natural frequencies. Imagine 1,000 women. A prevalence of 
1% means that 10 of 1,000 women will have breast cancer and 990 not. A sensitivity of 90% means that of those 
10 women with cancer, 9 will have a positive mammogram. A false positive rate of 9% means that of the 990 
women without cancer about 89 will nevertheless have a positive mammogram. Hence, a total of 98 women (= 
9+89) will test positive, but of these 98 only 9 will have cancer, which corresponds to roughly 10%. 
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helpful for evaluating classifiers (e.g., sensitivity, specificity, receiver-operating curves), and 
how to develop and test different classifiers, including heuristic ones (e.g., fast-and-frugal 
trees; Luan, Schooler, & Gigerenzer, 2011; Martignon, Katsikopoulos, & Woike, 2008) in 
cross validation. 
In short, science evaluation – like most judgments in our daily lives – concerns 
uncertainty; however, in many educational curricula around the world, more emphasis seems 
to be placed on mathematics of certainty (e.g., calculus) than on statistical thinking and 
genuine tools for dealing with uncertainty, such as heuristics (see Gigerenzer, 2014). The best 
bet would be that statistical literacy and the critical reflection upon statistics form part of 
school education, much like reading, writing, or history. As a helpful side effect, then also 
those putting stakes on bibliometric and other numbers – including mere consumers of 
science evaluations such as administrators, politicians or normal citizens – might have better 
intuitions about what to take from those statistics and what not, as well as when to not request 
numbers in the first place. 
A note on how to put the toolbox into practice 
We do not advocate for any of our recommendations to be put in practice in isolation. 
Rather, we believe that it is the simultenous implantation of all three that can aid science 
evaluation. To illustrate this, imagine only the recommendation that expert bibliometricians 
perform evaluations would be implemented. The result could be that those “experts” in 
bibliometric numbers become too powerful in a research evaluation: decision making may 
then be based too much on technical bibliometric criteria rather than on substantive (including 
qualitative) considerations made by researchers from the field. In contrast, if those who 
perform the evaluation are not only experts in bibliometrics but also experts in the field under 
study, and if moreover those experts understand that they are, essentially, making decisions 
under uncertainty and that, here, often simple decision strategies can help (e.g., Mousavi & 
Gigerenzer, 2014), then there might be room for both quantitative evaluation and substantive, 
qualitative considerations. Finally, if all involved have good statistical knowledge then they 
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might additionally be in a better position to know, for instance, when which of many different 
quantitative indicators is useful, or how to best collect and evaluate general publication 
statistics for a given field. 
Importantly, an implication of the toolbox view is the need of establishing an error 
culture – designs of institutions, work contracts, and review proceedures that aid dealing with 
the mistakes that any judgement under uncertainty can entail, including evaluations of people, 
departements, or research output. That does not necessarily only entail bolstering the effects 
of errors, but it also entails investigating the potential sources of errors in order to avoid them 
in the future. For instance, the results of Franzoni, Scellato, and Stephan (2011) show that 
“cash incentives appear to encourage submission of research regardless of quality, as 
suggested by correlation with lower acceptance rates“ (p. 703). Ideally, one would get rid of 
those incentives, or if that is not possible, create and systematically test counterbalancing 
ones, such as requiring experts in the research field to establish whether a publication is 
“worthwhile” to be counted. 
Note the words “investigating” and “test” were put in italics in the previous sentences: 
steady empirical research is required to continuously evaluate the effects of science 
evaluations, including how they change people’s behavior and science as a social system 
(Rijcke, Wouters, Rushforth, Franssen, & Hammarfelt, 2016). In a sense, it is ironic that those 
who advocate systematic metrics-based science evaluation and monitoring do not advocate, 
with the same fervor, a ceaseless systematic empirical evaluation of science evaluation itself. 
Here, perhaps the simple rule to avoid silo-thinking might help: an area – outside science – 
where sources of errors and counter-measures are systematically investigated and monitored 
is the international aviation industry; another area to turn to might be decision scientists’ and 
behavioral economists’ research on how incentives shape behavior. 
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Conclusions 
Substance abuse is not only potentiated by anxiety, but abuse also potentiates anxiety. 
People start to consume drugs because they are afraid; the more often they consume, the more 
frequently they will feel anxious – a vicious circle. Anxiety is, too, a driving factor behind 
phobias and obsessive compulsive disorders: Compulsory behaviors (e.g., ceaseless 
counting), intrusive thoughts (e.g., repeating magic numbers), or avoidance of stimuli and 
thoughts (e.g., about death) are born out of the desire to cope with unbearable fears, for 
example, in desperate attempts to gain control of an uncertain and potentially threatening 
future. Similar to drug abuse, the more often those behaviors are carried out, the more impetus 
they gain – upon executing a thought ritual or a compulsion, the fear momentarily decays 
away, but only to emerge ever more strongly thereafter. So the behavior is carried out again – 
a spiral of increasing addiction starts. One that – akin to a virus – can “infect” other 
individuals too. In the process, trust in rituals eventually displaces trust in one’s own good 
judgments (Morschitzky, 2009). 
It looks as if parts of academia and society suffer from collective anxiety, with various 
forms of number-crunching having developed into fear-reducing “mental drugs” to cope with 
the unreducible and unbearable uncertainties surrounding scientific judgment problems. Be it 
when it comes to evaluating theories, findings, or data, or when it comes to judging people, 
papers, and institutions, often there simply is no clear answer. But there are ignorant 
reviewers, hiring committee members, peers, lawyers, politicians and other respect-inspiring 
authorities who insist on obtaining a clear, “objective”, justifiable answer. If the answer is not 
given by yourself, dear scientist, then another colleague, likely drugged by his or other’s 
numbers, will be quick to offer one. This offer will then be marketed – at least initially – as 
implying progress, for instance, over your self-admitted ignorance or the pasts’s mere 
intuitions and hunches. 
Indeed, it is, ultimately, thanks to numbers, precise measurement, elaborated statistics, 
and quantification, that we have gone beyond Epicure’s reasoning about atoms, the 
 38 
geographic drawings of the Roman Tabula Peutingeriana, shaman cures of diseases, or 
Newton’s classical mechanics, all of which, so one might think, are located somewhere below 
us on a gigantic staircase parting from the past, reaching into the present and rising up into an 
even brighter future. We agree with the view that numbers aid science and society to progress. 
Yet, we also think that one should, perhaps, once in a while, walk the staircase of scientific 
and societal developments backward, in quest of what seems to have gotten lost on the way 
up: good human judgment. How can this be done? Thinking about the past can aid us to intuit, 
and hence possibly shape, the future. This is not only true for us, as human beings – we all are 
the past’s future skulls – but also for the historical trends which might put the contemporary 
number-obsession into prespective.  
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Author Note 
This essay is meant to be (thought) provocative. Its goal is not to damnify numbers, but rather 
to trigger reflection on what numbers tend to do to science and society– a word of caution in 
the age of digitalization in science evaluation, written by two number-crunchers. One of us is 
a professional bibliometrician in one of Europe’s largest research institution, with largest 
being measured in terms of institutes, employees, and annual number of publications. The 
other is a decision scientist who has dedicated his career to the building of mathematical and 
computational models of judgment. Numbers are our daily business.  
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